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MERGERS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND ASSET SALES
CHAPTERS 1.10 AND 1.11
THOMAS K. JOHNSTONE, JR. AND JEAN A. GALLOWAY*

INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this article is the consideration of
those provisions of the South Carolina Business Corporation
Act of 1962 relating to consolidations, mergers' and certain
other combinations not constituting either a consolidation or
a merger, but having certain features in common therewith.2
Unless otherwise identified, cited sections are sections of the
act.
A consolidation and a merger are not in legal effect the
same,3 and both should be distinguished from other combinations and transactions entered into by corporations which do
not constitute either a consolidation or a merger; e. g., a sale
of assets transaction. A consolidation is a combination by
agreement between two or more corporations of the same or
different states, under authority of law, by which their rights,
privileges, immunities, franchises and property are fused,
and become the rights, privileges, immunities, franchises and
property of a newly formed corporation, composed of the
original corporations. 4 On the other hand, a merger is the
absorption of one or more corporations by another corporation, which retains its name and corporate identity with the
added capital, franchises and powers of the merged corporation or corporations. 5
In a merger or consolidation, the absorbed corporations are
dissolved by operation of law,6 while in the case of a sale of
assets transaction, a dissolution of the selling corporation is
*Haynsworth, Perry, Bryant, Marion and Johnstone, Greenville, S. C.
1. Chapter 1.10, S. C. CODE §§12-20.1,12-20.9 (Supp. 1962).
2. Chapter 1.11, S. C. CODE §§12-21.1,12-21.5 (Supp. 1962).
3. The present law uses the term "consolidation" to refer to all types
of statutory corporate fusions. S. C. CODE §12451 (1962).
4. S. C. CODE §§12-20.2,12-20.7

(Supp. 1962); 15 FLETCHER, CYCLu-

PEDiA OF THm LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §7041 (1961).
5. S. C. CODE §12-20.1,12-20.6,12-20.7 (Supp. 1962); FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §7041 (1961).
6. S. C. CODE §12-20.6(b) (2) (Supp. 1962); Citizens & Southern Nat'l
Bank of S. C. v. Conner, 195 S. C. 203, 11 S. E. 2d 271 (1940).
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not effected automatically.7 In this latter instance, further
s
procedures must be taken under the dissolution section of
the act for cessation of the corporate existence of the selling
corporation.
I.

POWER TO CONSOLIDATE OR MERGE

It must be borne in mind that no merger or consolidation of
corporations can be effected without statutory authority of
the state or sovereignty which created such corporations. 9 It
has been held that any attempt to consolidate or merge without such authority is ultra vires and void. 10 Under present
law, prohibitions against certain consolidations and mergers
do exist," but these prohibitions are not contained in the act
and authority for both consolidation and merger with domestic and foreign corporations is conferred on all domestic
corporations provided the law of the foreign jurisdiction
permits. 12
II.

STEPS AND PROCEEDINGS TO EFFECT
CONSOLIDATION OR MERGER

A. Mergers and Consolidationsof Domestic Corporations
A statute enabling corporations to consolidate or merge
does not, of itself, effect a consolidation or merger without
some action or agreement to that end by the corporations involved, but merely authorizes them to take the proper steps
to bring about the merger or consolidation. The first step to
be taken under the act by the corporations is the adoption
by the board of directors of each corporation involved in the
transaction of a plan of merger or consolidation. The requirements respecting the contents of the plan are set forth
in section 12-20.1 and section 12-20.2 of the act. It has been
held that if the plan substantially complies with the requirements of the statute, mere informalities or omissions will not
invalidate it.13
7. 15 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§7043 (1961).

8.

S. C. CODE §§12-22.1,12-22.23 (Supp. 1962)

9. Clearwater v. Meredith, 1 Wall 25, 17 L. Ed. 604 (1863).
10. First State Bank of Mangum v. Lock, 113 Okla. 30, 237 Pae. 606
(1925); 15 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§7048 (1961).
11. S. C. CODE §§12-451,12-4561,12-466 (1962).
12. S. C. CODE §12-20.7(a) (Supp. 1962).
13. Phinizy v. Augusta & K. R. R., 62 Fed. 678 (Cir. Ct., D. S. C.
1894) ; Wells v. Rodgers, 80 Mich. 525. 27 N. W. 671 (1886).
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The act contains no requirements concerning or restricting
the terms and conditions of the plan. It merely requires that
such terms and conditions as are agreed upon by the respective boards of directors of the affected corporations must be
set forth in the plan of the proposed merger or proposed
consolidation.' 4 It has been held that the board of directors
may agree to any terms and conditions, so long as such provisions are not in conflict with the general law and are not
inconsistent with the articles of incorporation of the respective corporations. 15
Once the plan of merger or consolidation has been agreed
upon by the respective boards of directors, it must be submitted to a vote of the shareholders of each corporation at
either an annual or a special meeting. The actisa requires
at least twenty days' written notice to each shareholder of
record entitled to vote at the meeting. The notice must state
the purpose of the meeting, must contain a clear and concise
statement concerning the rights of dissenting shareholders,",
and must be accompanied by a copy of the plan, 17 by reasonably detailed balance sheets of each participating corporation
for the three fiscal years preceding the date of the plan, and
by profit and loss statements of each corporation for a similar
period. Although the act does not so state, it is persumed
that if a corporation has been in existence for less than three
years, balance sheets and profit and loss statements covering
the company's operations from the date of its inception will
satisfy the requirements of the act.
The approval by the shareholders of the plan is obtained by
a vote taken at the meeting called for such purpose. Each"
outstanding share is entitled to vote on the proposed plan,
whether or not such share has the right to vote under the
provisions of the articles of incorporation of such corporation..
The affirmative vote required for approval of the plan may
be either that vote properly prescribed by the articles of incorporation, or in the absence of such a provision in the articles, that vote prescribed by the act.
14. S. C. CODE §§12-20.1 (b) (2),20.2 (b) (2) (Supp. 1962).
15. Adams v. Yazoo & M. Val. R. R., 77 Miss. 194, 24 So. 200, 28 So.
956, affd, 180 U. S.1 (1898).
15a. S. C. CODE §12-20.3 (Supp. 1962).
16. As provided in §6.27 of the act (S. C. CODE §12-16.27 (Supp. 1962))
and discussed hereinafter in Part III.
17. If the plan is unduly long or complex, the statement may contain
an outline of its material features. S. C. CODE §12-20.3(b) (2) (Supp.
1962).
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Certain provisions were included in the act for the. benefit
of close corporations in order that the shareholders of such
corporations, if they so desired, could have the benefit of
some of the advantages of a partnership. One of these is the
right to insert superstatutory voting requirements into the
articles of incorporation, and this right was carried over
into the voting requirement provisions of the merger and
consolidation sections of the act. Therefore, provisions can
be inserted in the articles of incorporation prescribing stricter
requirements on the affirmative vote of shareholders for the
approval of a plan of merger or consolidation.' If any such
provisions are included in the articles of incorporation, they,
of course, must be complied with to effect a valid approval of
the plan.
If no provisions concerning the required vote for approval
of a plan of merger or consolidation are contained in the
articles of incorporation, then the requirements as promulgated by the act must be satisfied."9 The act specifies a twothirds affirmative vote of all the outstanding shares of the
corporation. In addition, if any class of shares is entitled to
vote thereon as a class, there must be a two-thirds affirmative vote by the holders of the shares of such class. The instances in which a class vote must be taken are prescribed
by section 12-19.5 of the act. This section is effective only
when there exists in the corporate structure more than one
class of stock. The provision requiring a class vote will
operate to prevent common shareholders, by effecting a
merger or consolidation, from destroying preference rights
of other classes of shareholders which may have become distasteful to the common shareholders.
Upon approval of the plan of merger or consolidation by
the shareholders of each of the participating corporations,
articles of merger or of consolidation must be prepared, 20
executed, and verified pursuant to the general provisions of
the act.2 ' The articles are then delivered to the Secretary of
State for filing, and the transaction is deemed effected as of
18. See S. C. CODE §12-20.3(d) (Supp. 1962). Note particularly that
these limitations do not carry forward and are not applicable to the new
or surviving corporation unless the plan of merger or of consolidation so
provides.
19. S. C. CODE §12-20.3(c) (Supp. 1962).
20. S. C. CODE §12-20.4 (Supp. 1962) sets forth the information which
must be included in the articles of merger or con-nlidations.
21. See S. C. CODE §§12-11.4,12-11.5 (Supp. 1962).
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the filing date. If the articles so specify, the effective date
of the merger or consolidation can be postponed to a date
not to exceed sixty (60) days from the filing date of the
articles.

22

B.

Parent-SubsidiaryMergers

Section 12-20.5 offers a simple, speedy and inexpensive
procedure for merging one or more subsidiaries into a parent
corporation. This procedure is known as the "short form"
merger and is the only part of these sections dealing with
mergers and consolidations which is radically new. This
section, which in essence is taken from the Model Business
Corporation Act,22a provides that a parent corporation owning

at least 95% of the outstanding shares of each class of stock
of another corporation or corporations may merge such subsidiary or subsidiaries into the parent by doing the following:
(1) The board of directors of the parent adopts the plan
of merger.28
(2) Mailing a copy of the plan to the shareholders of the
subsidiaries. 24
(3) On the 30th day after mailing such plan to the
shareholders, filing the papers necessary to effect
25
the merger with the Secretary of State.
It should be noted that no shareholder approval is required
in the short form merger. This is based upon the fact that a
5% interest of outside shareholders of the subsidiary is insufficient to block the merger, and upon the reasoning that
any unfair treatment of these outside shareholders can be
adequately protected under the appraisal rights available to
any shareholders who dissent. Shareholders of the parent are
given neither voting rights nor dissenters' rights, because
normally a parent-subsidiary merger of this type would not
materially affect their interests as the merger merely effects
22. S.C. CODE §§12-11.6,12-20.6 (Supp. 1962). It should be noted that
there is no comparable provision in the act to S. C. CODE §12-454 (1962)
which required recording of the articles of merger or consolidation in the
county where the new or surviving corporation was to be located and in
the counties where the participating corporations' original charters were
filed. Under the act the only required filing is with the Secretary of
State; there is no recording.
22a. Hereinafter referred to as the "MODEL AcT."
23. S.C. CODE §12-20.5 (a) (1) (Supp. 1962).

24. S.C. CODE §12-20.5(a) (2) (Supp. 1962).
25. S.C. CODE §12-20.5(a) (3) (Supp. 1962).
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a formal change in the corporate structure. However, under
the act, it is possible that these shareholders may have the
nature of their investment changed against their wills by reason of a short form merger. Massachusetts, New York, and
Nevada provide for a short form merger only when the subsidiary's business is similar or incidental to the business of
the parent. 26 Our act contains no such provision; however,
it seems that a provision of this type would afford protection
to the shareholders of the parent against a radical change in
the nature of their investment. In any event, these shareholders should have or should be given the right to seek an
injunction to set aside a bad-faith or fraudulent transaction. 2'
The constitutionality of a similar provision in Delaware
28
was sustained in the case of Coyne v. Park & Tilford Corp.
on the authority of the state's reserved power to amend corporate charters by subsequent general legislation.
The interpretation of this statute by the Delaware courts
in the Coyne case, supra, and in Stauffer v. StandardBrands,
Inc.20 is quite interesting. In the Coyne case, the court held
that this section granted substantive as well as procedural
rights by giving the parent corporation the power and the election of paying the minority shareholders of the subsidiary cash
rather than offering them securities or other obligations of
the parent and thus eliminating their interest in the corporate
entities3 0 In the Stauffer case, the plaintiffs, minority shareholders of the subsidiary, were seeking to set aside a short
form merger on the grounds that the price to be paid the
minority shareholders so grossly undervalued their stock that
it constituted a constructive fraud on them. The court stated
that in a merger, other than short form mergers, such a gross
undervaluation, shocking to the court's conscience, may be
constructive fraud warranting setting aside a merger. How26. MASs. GEN. LAWS Ch. 156, §46A(2); NEv. Rv. STAT. §78.540;
N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §85.

27. See discussion, Rights of Dissenting ShareWders, page 422. infra.

28. 154 A. 2d 893 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1959), affirming 146 A. 2d 785 (Del.
Ch. 1958).
29. 178 A. 2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1962). This case has been appealed to the
Supreme Court of Delaware and was argued on November 17, 1962. Therefore, the rationale of this case may be entirely erroneous by the time
of the publication of this article.
30. In the regular merger transaction, minority stockholders may not
be summarily eliminated from the continuing enterprise, but are given
the option of accepting securities in the surviving corporation, or, alternatively, of demanding payment in cash for their holdings by an appraisal
proceeding pursuant to S. C. CODE §20-16.27 (Supp. 1962).
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ever, under the short form merger provisions, such undervaluation does not afford grounds for setting aside the merger
and the appraisal remedy of the minority shareholders of the
subsidiary under these circumstances provides them with an
adequate and complete remedy which is exclusive.3 1
Finally, subsection (b) of section 12-20.5 states that "Any
plan of merger which requires or contemplates any changes
other than those specifically authorized by this section shall
be accomplished under the provisions of section 12-20.1." This
subsection is for the protection of the shareholders of the
parent corporation; otherwise the board of directors of the
parent, through the short form imerger provisions, could effectively amend the articles of incorporation of the parent
and circumvent the required vote of the shareholders in favor
32
,of such amendment.
C.

Mergers and Consolidations of Domestic and Foreign
Corporations

It is well known that a merger or consolidation of a domestic corporation and a foreign corporation is not authorized in
the absence of specific statutory authority even where such
authority exists for mergers and consolidation of domestic
corporations. 33 Subsection (a) of section 12-20.7 of the act
is the grant of such general merger and consolidation authority respecting foreign and domestic corporations and subsection (b) of this section grants authority for the short form
merger, provided, in both instances, the laws of the jurisdiction of the foreign corporation permit such combinations.
This section provides that each corporation shall comply
with the provisions of the law of its respective jurisdiction,
and in the event the surviving or new corporation is a foreign
corporation, such corporation shall comply with the laws of
this state in respect to foreign corporations in order to do
business in this state.8 4 In any event, the new or surviving
foreign corporation shall file with the Secretary of State a
31. Query: Would illegality in the proceedings be sufficient grounds
for setting the merger aside?
32. Section 10.6(b) (6) of the act (S. C. CODE §12-20.6(b) (6) (Supp.
1962) states that the articles of incorporation shall be deemed to be
amended
of merger.to the extent that changes in the articles are stated in the plan
33. Villiam B. Bicker & Son Co. v. United Drug Co., 79 N. J. Eq.
580, 82 AtI. 930 (1912).
34. S. C. CoDe §12-20.7(d) (1) (Supp. 1962).
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the primary purpose of which is to ensure service of process
on the surviving or new corporation and the payment of
shareholders who dissent to the transaction. 5
There is nothing radically new in these provisions. They
adhere closely to section 70 of the Model Act and are in substantial harmony with the present law governing mergers
and consolidations between foreign and domestic corpora36
tions.
D.

Authority to Abandon Merger or Consolidation

There is no comparable provision to section 12-20.8 in the
existing corporation laws of this state. This section permits
the board of directors of any participating corporations to
abandon the merger or consolidation at any time prior to the
filing of the articles of merger or consolidation, provided the
plan of merger or consolidation contains such authority.
Since the authority for abandonment must be contained in
the plan, it would appear that, from a practical standpoint,
all plans should contain such a provision, as the transactions
may evoke such a number of demands for "appraisal" and
resulting payment that the surviving or new corporation may
not be able to withstand the financial burden. Also, changes
in economic conditions may indicate that the proposed combination is no longer feasible. Without this statutory authority,
a provision for abandonment in the plan may be held to constitute an improper delegation of authority by the shareholders. 37

III. RIGHTS OF DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS
A.

Mergers and Consolidztion

At common law no merger or consolidation could take place
without the unanimous consent of all shareholders. As stated
in Johnson v. Baldwin:3 8
Unanimous consent required at common law empowered
a dissenting stockholder to compel the maj6rity to buy
him out on his own terms in order to effect a merger or
35. S. C. CODE §1220.7(d) (2) (Supp. 1962).
36. S. C. CODE §§12-456.1,12-456.8 (1962).
37. See Fuld, Some Practical Aspects of a Merger, 60 HAnv. L. REV.
1092, 1096 (1947).
38. 221 S. C. 141, 69 S. E. 2d 585, 591 (1952).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss2/8

8

423
SALESSales--Chapter
AND ASSET
CONSOLIDATIONS,
MERGERS,
Johnstone
and Galloway:
Mergers, Consolidations,
and Asset
1.10 and 1.11
1963.]
consolidation. In seeking to remedy the foregoing condition, however, it was found necessary to protect the minority, if they regarded the sale as opposed to their interests, and allow them to retire from the enterprise upon
the payment to them of the value of their shares. The
remedy of appraisal and payment was intended to afford
fair and just compensation to the dissenters and at the
same time provide a method by which their objections
could be fairly composed so as to enable the consolidation
to proceed.
Section 12-20.9 contains the general grant of authority to
shareholders to dissent from mergers and consolidations. In
order to perfect this right a shareholder must comply with
the provisions of section 12-16.27.11 There are two exceptions
to this general right: (1) The shareholders of the parent
corporation in a short form merger have no right of dissent,
unless the parent is a corporation of a foreign jurisdiction
which grants such a right, and (2) the shareholders of a surviving parent corporation in a merger which owns all the
outstanding shares of its merging subsidiaries on the date of
the filing of the articles of merger have no such right. These
two exceptions are perfectly logical since the essential position of the shareholders of the parent normally remains unchanged.
B. Sale of Assets
A shareholder, by compliance with section 12-16.2740 has
the right of a dissenting shareholder to the payment of the
fair value of his shares, in a sale of assets transaction, except
in two situations: (1) when the sale is in the usual and regular course of business and (2) when the sale is for cash and
the proceeds are to be distributed within one year to the
shareholders. 41 The reason for the first exception is selfexplanatory. The basis for the second exception is that there
is no reason in such a case to permit any shareholder to attempt to realize more than he is to receive in the normal
course of distribution, nor more than his fellow shareholders
who do not dissent.
39. See discussion, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders, page 422, infra.
40. See discussion, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders, page 422, infra.
41. S. C. CODE §12-21.5 (Supp. 1962).
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C. Procedure
The procedure which must be followed by dissenting shareholders to perfect and preserve their rights of appraisal in
fundamental corporate changes is carefully set forth in section 12-16.27. For the sake of clarity, this procedure will be
outlined briefly, followed by a discussion of the section as a
whole. It must be borne in mind that a shareholder must
follow the required procedure precisely in order to protect his
42
rights of appraisal.
The procedure under this section is as follows:
1. Prior to or at the shareholders meeting a shareholder
must file a written objection to the proposed corporate ac43
tion.
2. At the meeting the shareholder must not vote in person
or by proxy in favor of the action. Silence on the part of the
shareholder at the meeting will apparently satisfy this requirement, 44 as he is not required by the language of the
statute to vote against the action.
3. Within 20 days after the meeting a written demand for
the payment of his shares must be filed with the corporation,
or in the case of a merger or consolidation, with the surviving
or new corporation. In the case of a short form merger the
demand must be filed with the parent corporation within
twenty days after the plan of merger shall have been mailed
45
to the shareholders of the subsidiary corporation.
4. At the time of filing the demand or within 20 days
thereafter the shareholder must submit his share certificates
to be stamped with a notation thereon to the effect that a
demand for appraisal of such shares has been made and that
the holder thereof is no longer entitled to any of the normal
shareholder rights. A failure on the part of the shareholder
to comply with this requirement does not automatically work
a forfeiture of his right to appraisal; however, the corporation does have the option of terminating his rights of appraisal unless a court of competent jurisdiction directs otherwise.'*
42. In re Universal Pictures Co., 28 Del. Ch. 72, 37 A. 2d 615 (1944);
In re O'Brien, 182 Misc. 577, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
43. S. C. CODZ §12-16.27(b) (Supp. 1962).
44. S. C. CODe § 12-16.27(c) (Supp. 1962).
45. S. C. CODM §12-16.27 (c) (Supp. 1962).

46. S. C. CODF §12-16.27 (f) (Supp. 1962).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss2/8

10

Johnstone
and Galloway:
Mergers, Consolidations,
and Asset
Sales--Chapter
1.10 and 1.11
425
1963] MERGERS,
CONSOLIDATIONS,
AND ASSET
SALES
47
5. Within ten days after the corporate action is effected
or ten days after the expiration of the demand period (whichever is later), the corporation must make a written offer to
the demanding shareholders to purchase their shares at a
fixed price. The price offered must be the same for all shareholders of each class and must be accompanied by a balance
sheet of the corporation in which the dissenting shareholder
holds shares, and a profit and loss statement of the same
corporation covering twelve months' operations and ending
with the date of the balance sheet. The balance sheet must
be as of the latest available date and not more than twelve
48
months prior to the date of such offer.
G. Within thirty days of the effected corporate action or
thirty days of the expiration of the demand period, whichever
is later, and upon a failure of the shareholder and the corporation to agree, the corporation has an additional thirty days in
which to institute an in rem proceeding to determine the fair
value of the shares. Upon failure of the corporation to act
within the subscribed period, a dissenting shareholder has
thirty days in which to institute action for this purpose. Upon
institution of suit by either party, the court determines
whether the shareholders are entitled to be paid, and the
"fair value" of their shares. Appraisers may be appointed.
Judgment may be entered, including, at the court's discretion,
interest and costs. Thereafter, the corporation pays the "fair
value" of the shares of such dissenters and satisfies any
49
judgment that may have been entered.
If the above procedure is carefully adhered to, a demanding
shareholder will be entitled to payment of the fair value of
his shares. However, certain questions are likely to arise
under this section. It is impossible in an article of this type
to fully cover each of these problems or questions, as any one
of them could well be the topic of a separate article, but some
of them will be dealt with in summary form.
The decisions of the courts of this state in dealing with the
rights of dissenting shareholders are practically nonexistent.
Therefore, it has been necessary to use decisions of jurisdic.

47. Corporate action is deemed to have been effected (a)

in a merger

or consolidation when the articles are filed or on the effective date when
such is postponed under the articles to a time subseouent to the filing
date, and (b) in a sale of assets transaction when the sale is consummated. S. C. CODE §12-16.27(g) (Supp. 1962).
48. S.C. CODE §12-16.27(g) (Supp. 1962).
49. S. C. CODE §12-16.27(h),12-16.27(i)
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tions other than South Carolina which have statutes similar
to the act in arriving at a conclusion as to the manner in
which this section will probably be interpreted by the courts
of this state. It should be borne in mind, however, that it has
been held in this state that statutes of this type are to be
liberally construed in favor of the shareholder, on the theory
that they have deprived the shareholder of his right to prevent a major corporate change and have abrogated the rule
requiring unanimous approval of such change.5 0
Must a shareholder be a registered shareholder in order to
have the right to dissent and, if so, must he be registered on
the record date in order to avail himself of the appraisal right
granted by the statute? Throughout section 12-16.27, the
word "shareholder" is used. In subsection (a) of section
12-11.2 "shareholder" is defined as one who is a holder of
record in the corporation. It is submitted that the words of
the statute should be construed to mean that only registered
holders of shares will be entitled to dissent to the proposed
corporate action. 51 Since the shareholder must make his first
move in order to perfect his appraisal rights at the meeting
at which the proposed action is to be voted upon, it would
appear that he must be a registered holder on the meeting
date; but the question remains that perhaps the right is limited to shareholders as of the record date for the meeting.
In Lewis v. Corroon and Reynolds Corp.52 the court, in interpreting a statute similar to this section, stated:
A reading of the appraisal statute reveals two things pertinent here. One, the record date is not mentioned. Two,
a stockholder in order to qualify for an appraisal need
not vote against the proposed merger. The only requirement voting-wise is that such a stockholder must not vote
in favor of the merger if he intends to qualify for an appraisal of his shares.
... I can find no necessary connection here between the
requirements for an appraisal and the record date for
voting on a proposed merger since a shareholder seeking
an appraisal need not vote at all. 53
50. Manning v. Brandon Corp., 163 S. C. 178, 161 S. E. 405 (1931).
51. Coyne v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 155 A. 2d 238 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1959);
Salt Dome Corp. v. Schenck, 28 Del. Ch. 433, 41 A. 2d 583, 158 A. L. R.
975 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
52. 30 Del. Ch. 200, 57 A. 2d 632 (Ch. 1948).
53. Accord, Application of Bozar, 183 Misc. 736, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 521
(Sup. Ct. 1944).
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Based on this reasoning, it appears that the registration
requirements are satisfied if the shareholder is a registered
shareholder on the meeting date.
In the normal situation, an equitable owner may fully protect his rights by procuring, a proxy and a power of attorney
from the registered owner. The necessity for a power of attorney stems from the requirement that a written objection
must be filed as the first step towards perfecting appraisal
rights. The only instance in which inequities might arise is
in those cases where brokers, trustees, or agents hold stock in
their names for several beneficial owners, some of whom
wish to dissent. As it now stands, the shareholder must dissent on an "all or nothing" basis. There is a provision in the
Model Act that a shareholder may dissent to less than all the
shares registered in his name.5 4 A provision of this type
-would eliminate inequities which might arise in such a situation. The reasoning behind this provision of the Model Act
is quite sound, and it would appear that a similar provision
should be incorporated in the act. However, it is suggested
that the right granted be limited to shareholders who are
fiduciaries for several beneficial owners, and that all the
shares of a particular beneficial owner be required to be
voted alike. This would prevent a normal shareholder from
hedging on the transaction by voting half his shares in favor
of the proposed action and dissenting as to the other half.
What is the meaning of the term "fair value"? The statute
does not attempt to define this phrase and there are no decisions interpreting the word "value" as used in the existing
statutes of this state. 5 Twenty-two states and the District of
Columbia use fair value as the basis for appraisal awards
iid "the cases from these jurisdictions indicate that there is
no definite rule for determining 'fair value' but that the
proper result in each case will depend on the particular cir54. MODEL ACT §73. This provision appeared as subsection (j) of the
Draft Version of §6.27 of the act, but was deleted prior to the introduction
of the bill into the Legislature. It read as follows: "A shareholder may
dissent as to less than all of the shares registered in his name. In such
event, his rights shall be determined as if the shares to which he has
dissented and his other shares were registered in the names of different
shareholders:"
55. S. C. CODE §§12-459,12-461 (1962).
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cumstances of the corporation involved." 50 However, the act
does set forth the date as of which "fair value" is to be determined 5 7 and that it is not to reflect any appreciation or
depreciation in the value of the shares resulting from the
action taken by the corporation.
Under the act, a dissenting shareholder is thereafter entitled only to payment of the fair value of his shares and
loses all other rights as a shareholder.58 However, under subsection (e) a shareholder's status will be restored in certain
situations. Upon the restoration of a shareholder's status, is
he entitled to corporate distributions made during the interim? It would seem so, but to eliminate all doubt it might
be wise that a provision similar to that contained in the old
New York Stock Corporation Law be added to clarify the situation.59
Finally, is the shareholder's appraisal remedy an exclusive
remedy? There apparently is no definite answer to this question. The following is taken from an annotation ° on this
question and quite succinctly gives the status of the law:
...
[T]he cases are conflicting on the question whether
statutes of the type under consideration furnish the exclusive remedy to the minority stockholder who objects
to the plan of consolidation, merger, or reorganization of
the corporation, or whether disregarding that remedy he
may pursue other equitable remedies on the theory that
his remedy under the statute is inadequate, to recover
from the resulting corporation an amount greater than
that permitted under the statute as the fair value of his
stock.
In some of the more recent cases also the view is taken
that the statutory remedy of the dissenting stockholder
is exclusive of all other remedies...
56. MoD. Bus. CORP. ACT ANNOT. §74( f4), at 411 (1960). However,
for a discussion of the factors which must be taken into account in de-

termining "fair market value" see American Gen. Corp. v. Camp, 171
Md. 269, 190 Atl. 225 (1937); Phelps v. Watson-Stillman Co., 365 Mo.
1124, 293 S. W. 2d 429 (1956).
57. The date for determination of fair value is the day prior to the
date on which the vote was taken approving the corporate action. S. C.
CODE §12-16.27(a)

(Supp. 1962).

58. S. C. CODE §12-16.27(d) (Supp. 1962).
59. . . provided, that such shareholders shall thereupon be entitled
to receive any dividends, distributions or other rights to which he would
have been or would have become entitled had he not demanded payment
for his stock. N. Y. STOCK ConP. LAw §21.
60. See annotation, 162 A. L. R. 1237, 1250, 1251 (1946).
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First, is a shareholder required to elect between dissenting
and thereby securing in the prescribed manner the fair cash
value of his stock, or, failing to dissent, being bound by the
terms of a combination? Secondly, is he required to make
an election even though the transaction is illegal or is tainted
with unfairness or fraud? There are no cases in this state
directly in point. However, Mr. Justice Oxner, in Johnson V.
Baldwin61 in which the court held that a dissenting shareholder cannot continue to prosecute a derivative action,
stated:
It is generally held that a dissenting stockholder is put
to an election by a statute of this kind. [Cases cited.]
There are sound reasons for this view. The proper
financing of the corporation may demand quick action.
The management is entitled to know how many of the
stockholders dissent from the proposed merger and thus
become potential demandants of cash. The requirement
as to election is reasonable... . Of course, as pointed out
in Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, supra, there may
be circumstances under which the duty to make an election does not arise. For instance, if the merger is not
authorized by law or if brought about through fraudulent conduct, the dissenting stockholder has the right to
go into a court of equity and seek an injunction against
consummation of the merger.
... Under these circumstances we think she was bound
by her election and may not now withdraw her demand
and restore her status as a stockholder. The statute admits of no other reasonable construction and to hold
otherwise would lead to great uncertainty and much confusion.
From the above it would appear that the courts of this
state would hold that the appraisal remedy is exclusive in
the absence of fraud or illegality, and in the case of a transaction which is illegal or tainted with fraud, the shareholder's
only remedy is to enjoin the proposed corporate action. Unfortunately, the opinion continues:
Finally, the argument is made that section 7759 does not
furnish an adequate remedy for the fair determination
of the value of the plaintiff's stock. Since it appears to
61. 221 S. C. 141,69 S. E. 2d 585 (1952).
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be conceded, and properly so we think, that under the
procedure laid down by section 7759, any right of the
Brandon Corporation sought to be enforced by plaintiff
may be considered as an asset in evaluating plaintiffs
stock, there would seem to be little, if any, basis for the
claim that she cannot get proper compensation under this
statute. But be that as it may, the question as to whether
the remedy afforded to a dissenting stockholder under
section 7759 is exclusive, upon which there is so much
conflict of authority, ... is a question that is not properly before us.
It is difficult to determine what effect this last statement
,of the court has on its prior statement in this same case.
What the courts of this state will finally decide on this ques*tion is a matter of conjecture. It would appear, however,
that the better rule is that a dissenting shareholder is limited
to his remedy under the appraisal statutes in the absence of
illegality or fraud, and where illegality or fraud is present in
a transaction, the shareholder is limited to injunctive proceedings to prevent the proposed merger. Otherwise, corporations can be subjected to a multiplicity of suits in different
courts having concurrent jurisdiction and to conflicting judgments affecting the same class of shares of stock.
This whole subject is complicated by subsection (k) of this
section. 62 This subsection did not appear in the Draft Version
of the act and is peculiar to this state. Joknson v. Baldwin6
held that a dissenting shareholder cannot continue to prosecute a derivative action. After a dissenting shareholder has
made demand for payment, there is a transitory period when
he is a shareholder in name only with none of the ordinary
incidents or rights of a shareholder. The reasoning of this
case appears sound and in keeping with the tenor of the appraisal statutes. It would seem that no purpose will be served
by enacting legislation in complete derogation of this decision
and other provisions of the act and allowing such a shareholder to sue in the right of the corporation. This provision
may also have the effect of making less certain the exclusive62. This subsection is as follows: "No action by a
right of the corporation shall abate or be barred by
shareholder has filed a demand for payment of the
shares pursuant to the provisions of this section." S. C.
(Supp. 1962).

shareholder in the
the fact that the
fair value of his
CoDZ §12-16.27 (k)

63. 221 S. C. 141, 69 S. E. 2d 585 (1952).
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ness of the appraisal remedy. Since this provision is likely
to lead to conflicts and uncertainty, the Legislature should
consider its repeal.
IV.

Sale or Other Disposition of
CorporateAssets
When all or substantially all of the assets of a corporation
are sold, leased or exchanged in the regular course of business, approval by the board of directors is sufficient authorization to constitute a valid sale, lease or exchange.0 4 However, if the articles of incorporation so provide, shareholder
approval of the transaction will be necessary. 5 Whether or
not a transaction is to be deemed within the regular course
of business is a question of fact which is determined by the
circumstances surrounding the transaction. 66 However, section 12-21.2(c) gives certain guidelines for determining this
question. If the nature of the business will be changed thereby, the sale is not in the regular course of business, but if
the business was incorporated for the purpose of liquidating
such assets, or if the sale is a transaction or one of a series
of transactions made in the furtherance of the business of the
corporation and not to terminate or dispose of its business,
then the sale is deemed to be one in the regular course of
business. 67
If the sale is not within the regular course of business, not
only is the approval of the board of directors necessary, but
a two-thirds vote of all the shareholders is required, including
a two-thirds class vote, if such class is entitled to vote thereon
as a class.68 Super-statutory voting requirements may be
included in the articles of incorporation. 69 The act gives the
board of directors authority to abandon the sale, subject to
the rights of third parties to any contracts relating thereto. 70
The Model Act also requires the above procedure for mortgages and pledges. 7 1 However, section 12-21.4 of the act entirely eliminates shareholder approval for mortgages or
pledges unless the articles of incorporation otherwise pro64. S. C. CODE .12-21.2(a) (Supp. 1962).
65. S.0. CODE §12-21.2 (b) (Supp. 1962).
66. S. C. CODE .12-21.2(c) (Supp. 1962).
67. S. C. CODE .12-21.2(c) (Supp. 1962).
68. S. C. CODE .12-21.3 (a) (Supp. 1962).

69. S. C. CODE §12-21.3(b) (Supp. 1962).

70. Note: This authority for abandonment is absolute in the Board of
Directors, whereas for such to exist in mergers and consolidations, it must

be included in the plan of merger or consolidation.
71. MODEL ACT §§71,72.
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vide. The elimination of shareholder approval in these transactions is wise, since the advantage gained by the shareholders in approving such liens is outweighed by the inconvenience
which the necessity for such approval creates in legitimate
mortgage situations. It seems clear that normal business
transactions of this type would be facilitated by eliminating
all requirements for shareholder approval of mortgages or
pledges, regardless of provisions contained in the articles of
incorporation. This becomes even more important when the
articles are not required to be recorded in the appropriate
local public records.
Three of the areas of probable litigation under the sale of
assets provisions are (1) the determination of when the transaction is deemed to be in the regular course of business; (2)
the rights of creditors; and (3) the determination of whether
there has been a de facto merger so as to allow the shareholders of the purchasing corporation the right to dissent from
the transaction.
The basis of the determination of the first question will be
the facts of the particular situation, and questions regarding
the rights of creditors are beyond the scope of an article of
this type. However, it appears that the third litigable area
should be discussed.
Section 12-21.5, like the Model Act,72 confers dissenter's

rights only upon the shareholders of the selling corporation,
although the shareholders of the purchasing corporation may
have an interest in the matter and a real grievance.72 a This can
happen, for instance, when a small corporation purchases assets of a large corporation so that the business of the purchasing corporation is substantially changed, or a large block
of stock is issued in payment for such assets.
In such a situation the judicial doctrine of de facto merger
can well come into play whereby the court concludes that
what is in form a sale of assets is in reality a merger subject
to appraisal rights of dissenters. The courts of South Carolina have perhaps recognized the de facto merger situation.
By dictum, the court in Beckroge -v. South Carolina Power Co.

said:
... The transfer of the assets of one corporation to another may amount to a merger in fact, although the cor72. MoDEL AcT §73.

72a. 197 S. C. 184, 194-195, 15 S. E. 2d 124 (1941).
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porate existence of the transferrer corporation continues.
Where such is the case, equity looks past the form, and
at the real effect of the transaction,...
The three leading cases in this area are: Farris v. Glen
Alden Corp.;7 3 Heilbrun v. Sun Chem. Corp.;7 4 Applestein
v. United Bd. & Carton Corp.7 5
In the Farris case, an agreement was entered into by a
relatively small corporation to purchase the assets of a large
corporation. After the consummation of the sale the purchasing corporation would be transformed from a coal mining
company to a diversified holding company; its assets would
amount to approximately $169,000,000 with a long-term debt
of $38,000,000 as compared with its prior assets of one-half
that size and with one-seventh the long-term debt; the directors of the selling corporation would have control; 76.5% of
the stock would be owned by the shareholders of the selling
corporation; and the book value of the stock would decrease
from $38.00 a share to $21.00 a share. The Pennsylvania
court stated that the rationale of the appraisal statutes was
"that when a corporation combines with another so as to lose
its essential nature and alter the original fundamental relationships of the shareholders among themselves and to the
corporation, a shareholder who does not wish to continue
his membership therein may treat his membership in the
original corporation as terminated and have the value of his
shares paid to him."'?ia
The court, in interpreting provisions similar to those of the
act, held:
So, as in the present case, .when as part of a transaction
between two corporations, one corporation dissolves, its
liabilities are assumed by the survivor, its executives and
directors take over the managem6nt and control of the
survivor, and, as consideration for the transfer, its stockholders acquire a majority of the shares of stockof the
survivor, then the transaction is no longer simply a purchase of assets or acquisition of property . . . but a
merger...
73. 393 Pa. 427, 143 A. 2d 25 (1958).
74. 150 A. 2d 755 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1959).
75. 60 N. J.S. 333, 159 A. 2d 146 (Super. Ct 1960).
75a. 393 Pa. 427, 143 A. 2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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The court went on to say that even if it were not a de
facto merger, in reality the nominal purchaser was the real
seller and under the statute granting the shareholders of the
selling corporation appraisal rights, the shareholders of the
nominal purchasing corporation had the right of dissent. 7
In the Heilbrun case, a sale of assets was involved and
the plaintiffs, shareholders in the purchasing corporation,
asserted a de facto merger which in turn entitled them to
appraisal rights. Unlike this state, Delaware grants no appraisal rights by statute to either the shareholders of the
purchasing or the selling corporation in sale of assets transactions. The court held that the plaintiffs had no appraisal
rights although a de facto merger existed, as no injury had
been inflicted upon them. They were not forced to accept
stock in another corporation; the reorganization had not
changed the essential nature of the enterprise of the purchasing corporation; nor was it a case where it could be said that
the seller acquired the purchaser.
The New Jersey court in the A'plestein case was confronted with a sale of stock situation in which the shareholders of
the purchasing corporation were asserting a de facto merger
which would give rise to appraisal rights for such shareholders. The court in applying corporate statutes similar to those
of the act, held that a de facto merger took place and, therefore, all shareholders were entitled to appraisal rights. The
court stated that the purchasing corporation was, in reality,
the selling corporation. However, the opinion of the court
intimated that in every de facto merger situation, regardless
of the consequences to the shareholders (as apparently is of
such vital importance in Delaware) all shareholders become
entitled to appraisal rights.
No attempt is made to predict how this question will be
resolved by the courts of this state, as the law elsewhere is
in such a state of flux. However, when the law on this point
crystalizes, it would seem that the problem should be elimi77
nated by the passage of appropriate legislation.
76. The PENNSYLVANIA BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW has been amended
to deal with such a situation as existed in the Farris case. See PENN.
B. C. L. §311, as amended by 1957 P. L. 711: 1959 P. L. 1406.
77. See Note, The Rights of Shareholders Dissenting from Corporate
Combinations to Demand Cash Payment for Their Shares, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 1132 (1959) for an excellent discussion of this problem.
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